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**United Nations
Department of Peace Operations /**

Strategy

Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) for Peacekeeping Operations

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DPO STRATEGY ON Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) for Peacekeeping Operations

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A. PURPOSE AND RATIONALE

1. This Strategy provides guidance to enable a coherent and synergistic response to mitigate the growing threats of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). It focuses on strengthening existing UN systems to address identified gaps and provides a framework to guide actions at various levels of the DPO's C-IED efforts.
 2. Due to the increasing sophistication and complexity of IED attacks and the continuously evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by adversarial networks, this Strategy provides a coherent approach under an overarching strategy to guide stakeholders' actions. The Strategy focuses on developing an integrated IED capacity to ensure early warning on IED threat dynamics, to enable continuous capability enhancement (personnel and equipment), and to create the right mindset for interoperability and consolidation of IED threat mitigation efforts.
 3. This Strategy incorporates the recommendations of the Independent Strategic Review on 'The United Nations Response to Explosive Ordnance Threats' (S/2021/1042)¹ and the 2023 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34)² to develop a Strategy to mitigate rising IED threats in field Missions. This Strategy also integrates the best practices of various member states, organisations and entities in mitigating and countering IED threats. This Strategy delineates the roles and responsibilities of UNHQ and Mission organisations and provides consolidated guidance on key activities within the C-IED operational pillars of Prepare/Train, Defeat the Device, and Engage/Degrade.
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¹ The United Nations Response to Explosive Ordnance Threats' (S/2021/1042) dated November 2021.

² A/77/19 United Nations Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2023 Substantive Session Page 48.

B. SCOPE

4. This Strategy applies to the DPO and its entities including peacekeeping operations. In addition, the strategy applies to IED networks, departments, organisations and entities with shared responsibilities in IED threat mitigation to enable coordinated and coherent actions when dealing with cross-cutting aspects. Though this Strategy focuses primarily on countering IED threats, some aspects will be applicable in mitigating and countering other Explosive Ordinance (EO) threats. Implementation of this Strategy is recommended.
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C. STRATEGY

5. The Strategy is built on a foundation of understanding the IED threat through Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI) and the three (3) operational pillars in Figure 1:
- Preparation of Peacekeepers
 - Defeating the Device; and
 - Degrading the Network.




Figure 1: C-IED Framework

6. Understanding Through Peacekeeping-Intelligence

- 6.1. This Strategy is derived from an understanding of the IED threat peacekeepers might encounter in peacekeeping operations. A shared understanding of the IED threat and what to expect in the field Missions guides a Troop/Police Contributing Country (T/PCC) in preparing unit(s) for deployment and shapes T/PCC planning and decision-making in mitigating IED threats and defeating the device. Additionally, insight into the trafficking of IED components and sharing of technical investigation reports concerning IEDs can help

to understand the threat and thereby support planning to disrupt the activities of threat actors and degrade the networks. In order to build this understanding, each Mission should employ the full architecture of its PKI entities³, as well as other personnel and assets to:

- identify the information needs;
- acquire, collate, and analyse the information; and
- disseminate relevant PKI products to all needed stakeholders.

6.2. These activities are governed by the PKI Policy (2019) The Policy articulates:

- a consistent and principled approach to PKI;
- ensures the most effective utilisation of available resources;
- establishes a robust regime of oversight, accountability and continuous improvement; and
- enacts mechanisms to enable an effective, integrated, and secure whole-of-mission approach.

6.3. The Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM) is the key mechanism used to manage PKI in missions by overseeing and directing the PKI cycle. The MICM includes the PKI entities responsible for acquisition, collation, analysis, and dissemination of PKI: the Joint Mission Analysis Centre, Force U2, Police Component Crime Intelligence Unit and UN Department of Safety and Security Information Unit. The Joint Operations Centre is also a permanent member of the MICM given its role in providing integrated situational awareness and supporting crisis-related deliberations. The MICM ensures alignment between the acquisition and analysis activities of all participating Mission PKI entities and the information requirements of Senior Mission Leadership, while operationalising appropriate oversight and accountability in the Mission's PKI management processes.

6.4. Technical Peacekeeping-Intelligence (TPKI) should be employed to understand the nature of the IED threat in an operating environment. TPKI is PKI derived from the acquisition and analysis of threat and military equipment and associated materiel. A subset of TPKI is Weapons Technical Peacekeeping-Intelligence (WTPKI) which is PKI derived from the processes and capabilities that acquire, exploit, and analyse conventional and asymmetric threat weapons systems and associated components. WTPKI is primarily focused on EO exploitation, the process by which the components of an EO are recorded and analysed, to better understand the functioning of the components and their connection within a larger system. It is important that exploitation activities are conducted continually to provide accurate PKI, develop effective countermeasures, and contribute to the prosecution of hostile elements. Exploitation activities will include acquisition and analysis of technical, tactical and forensic information. To facilitate C-IED efforts, information gleaned from TPKI must be fused and analysed with information from other sources before they are contextualised to the operating environment. The analysis should establish the intent, capability and opportunity of threat actors.

³ Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), Force U2, Police Component Crime Intelligence Unit (CIU), UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) security information unit, Joint Operations Centre (JOC) (supporting)

6.5. Missions should ensure that analysts with experience in C-IED operations are included in PKI entities to support a better understanding of IED threats. Missions are also to improve cooperation and liaison between PKI entities and UNMAS at all levels. In addition, it is essential to deploy sufficient (Mission-assessed number and capability) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Teams to record the tactical details of an incident as well as preserve, and recover physical, technical and forensic material.

7. Preparation of Peacekeepers

Integrated and Coherent Approach

7.1. The Santos Cruz Report (2017)⁴ established an urgent need for change in UN peace operation mindset from a conventional approach to an asymmetric one. The asymmetric approach requires systematic and dynamic integration and coordination of various stakeholders beyond the peacekeeping force. The widespread nature of IED networks requires that mission mandates promote cross-border cooperation and not limit certain requirements to geographical boundaries.

7.2. Preparation for countering IEDs is a whole-of-system approach comprising all measures necessary to resource stakeholders with the mindset for integration and interoperability of efforts. Preparation should not focus solely on preparing the T/PCC but must include stakeholders within the DPO, UN agencies, host nations and regional organisations. To achieve this, the DPO's/Mission's structure must adopt horizontal and vertical coordination and cooperation at all levels to ensure efficient managerial and operational integration with all relevant stakeholders. Details of this mechanism are illustrated as an example in Annex A.

7.3. A key task of all Peacekeeping Missions is to support the host nation to be capable of providing a safe and secure environment. Peacekeeping missions should support political engagement to strengthen the national systems and institutions of the host nations to respond appropriately to an IED threat. The level of support to be provided to host nations could be determined using the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research C-IED Assessment Tool. This could be supplemented by Member States offering to provide relevant capacity building measures and a mentoring system to assist national authorities to translate theoretical knowledge into practical capabilities. Also, when the capacity and resources are insufficient to meet the requirements, DPO should explore appropriate bilateral and regional arrangements to support Member States' requirements.

Training

7.4. DPO must devise measures to enhance T/PCCs' training on C-IED operations prior to and during deployment of the contingents. Member States should be encouraged to introduce training on different levels and aspects of C-IED capability into their national military/police training systems. The UN entities responsible for force generation and evaluation must ensure that uniformed personnel deployed to field Missions have undergone Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT). In addition, units performing mobile operations and movements are required to have requisite trainings to conduct basic search and detect functions while EOD technical experts must have specialized

⁴ Lieutenant General (rtd) Carlos dos Santos Cruz report on Improving Security of UN Peacekeepers: We have to change the way we do business. December 2017

EO/IED disposal training with the necessary competencies in accordance with UN doctrine⁵.

- 7.5. Pre-deployment trainings must be tailored to the assessed IED threat dynamics in the specific field Mission. T/PCCs are encouraged to exploit regional IED centres of excellence with purpose-built environments to simulating potential IED threat scenarios for a realistic training. Standardisation of pre-deployment training requirements ensures that the required capabilities are deployed thus reducing the time required for in-Mission training. This facilitates the rapid attainment of safe Mission-ready status.
- 7.6. In-Mission training should be structured to reinforce a mindset of integration and interoperability between various Mission and non-Mission components operating in an IED threat environment. To achieve this, training should span from individual level specialised training up to joint training with military/police contingents, UN staff and other stakeholders.
- 7.7. The Missions, in coordination with DPO must focus on facilitating/supporting/encouraging institutionalised C-IED related continuous capability building/enhancement based on routine refresher courses, drills and exercises for all stakeholders in Missions. The EOD units in Missions should assist in this process by training Infantry/Police units to conduct route search operations to complement the efforts of UNMAS. At the HQ level, Commanders, and key staff, together with other components and mission partners should be provided with IED Threat Mitigation Training to support the planning and conduct of operations in an IED threat environment.
- 7.8. Training, collaboration, and mentorship programs with the host nations as part of the wider Security Sector Reform are to include IED aspects. This should be aligned with other lines of effort to support the host nation to build and sustain capacity and capabilities.

Equipment

- 7.9. DPO/OMA is to ensure that the threat section of the Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR) contains an assessment on the emerging IED threat including the nature and intensity of threats and the evolving TTPs of hostile actors and adversarial networks. This will enable flexibility in providing commensurate equipment in the SUR to ensure sufficient operational capability and reducing the risk to peacekeepers.
- 7.10. Advances in technology must be leveraged with considerations of terrain and the environment in field Missions. Accordingly, DPO should encourage T/PCCs with appropriate technological equipment, competence, and capability to consider deploying contingents, technical specialist and staff in C-IED roles to enhance field mission capacity for effective IED threat mitigation. Additionally, DPO should encourage and enable shared/joint/co-deployment of units under bilateral or multilateral arrangements where possible capability gaps can be bridged by a joint deployment. This could involve T/PCCs with the required advanced technological equipment deploying with T/PCCs providing only personnel with the requisite competencies and capabilities, having due

⁵ Training Specified in the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Manual (currently 2021.11) and the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineering Unit CET Search and Detect Manual (currently 2020).

considerations for interoperability and joint training. To this end, efforts should be made to address the legal and political constraints to shared/joint deployments.

- 7.11. The prior stocking of IED-related critical UN Owned Equipment (UNOE) can bridge the equipment gap in Missions and mitigate the threats of IED risks in times of equipment unavailability. Hence, the UN should, through its various logistics arrangements, acquire and reserve critically needed IED equipment to enable rapid deployment to support IED efforts in Missions. Special focus should be placed on the acquisition of advanced detection technology to facilitate the efficient identification of threats allowing for safe disposal of IEDs thereby minimising the loss of life or injuries to peacekeepers. The medical and casualty evacuation equipment, first aid devices and aviation assets should be evaluated periodically, upgraded, and replaced when required, to enhance safety, minimise risks to peacekeepers and reduce fatalities.

Language Assistants

- 7.12. DPO must ensure language assistants/interpreters with adequate knowledge of the local languages are available in Field Missions to assist deployed contingents to enhance the effectiveness of outreach/community engagement programs. This is essential to improving relations with the local populace and increasing the awareness of IED threat.

Verification/Inspection

- 7.13. EOD Units or any unit that has an organic EOD capability or Search Team attached to it and tasked with conducting demining, EOD or Search procedures on behalf of the Mission as a force asset must comply with the relevant standards. These standards are described in the respective UN military manuals⁶.
- 7.14. The verification and inspection of EOD/IED capabilities is organised by the Mission COE units through six monthly operational readiness inspections (ORI). The ORI team should include either a Force Ammunition Technical Officer or a technical expert from UNMAS. Similarly, during pre-deployment verification, an IED specialist with experience in C-IED operations is to verify the status of equipment and training of personnel.

8. Defeating the Device

- 8.1. Defeating the device is a term used to describe a defensive (reactive) line of operation undertaken as part of IED Threat Mitigation activities (tasks). This includes all actions designed to decrease the likelihood and reduce the impact of IED on peacekeeping operations. These actions include mitigation, detection and disposal and will be described in subsequent paragraphs.
- 8.2. Senior and strategic level engagements must maintain focus on the mandated objectives while enabling tactical and operational level priorities. Operationally, DPO must ensure that peacekeeping is planned and poised with the flexibility to react in case of a changing IED threat. The C-IED stakeholders at Mission level must be granted the opportunity or mechanism to provide inputs into the Mission planning and Force generation processes.

⁶ Standards specified in the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Manual (currently 2021.11) and the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineering Unit CET Search and Detect Manual (currently 2020).

Mitigation

- 8.3. Mitigation must remain the core tenet of all peacekeeping C-IED efforts, with the understanding that a proactive approach presents the highest opportunity for success. Units tasked with mobile operations or logistical transport duties should be self-sufficient and include all necessary IED expertise. Joint patrolling with mixed units will bridge gaps in IED expertise and provide a conduit for mentoring of host nation security forces as well as support capacity building efforts.
- 8.4. Missions must therefore ensure they avoid predictable convoy or patrol patterns; and where feasible, alternative methods of logistical transport should be explored, e.g., air, sea, river to minimise road-based IED threats. Indirect mitigation efforts including leveraging technologies and improved operational efficient mechanisms are to be implemented.

Detection

- 8.5. Detection involves taking necessary actions to locate, access and confirm suspected IEDs. Specialist equipment may provide a Force multiplier effect, but it should not be taken as a panacea to negate the need for an effective mitigation approach. Support assets that offer increased situational awareness, such as the various PKI acquisition assets available to a Mission, may allow for greater understanding of the operational environment.
- 8.6. Airborne Peacekeeping Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PKISR) platforms such as fixed wing/rotary wing aircraft or Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), as well as space-based platforms such as satellites, offer the ability to observe areas where an IED threat may be present without exposing ground forces to immediate danger. Class I Commercial Off-the-Shelf micro and mini-UAS equipped with electro-optical/infra-red payloads offer generic situational awareness and may be used for a wide range of tasks, including some that could potentially contribute to the wider C-IED effort. These systems also have the advantage of being relatively low-cost, flexible, and easy to use.

Disposal

- 8.7. Disposal or the rendering safe of IEDs is the tactical core element of C-IED activities. DPO must ensure that all such operations are conducted in accordance with UN doctrine⁷, specifying the skills and equipment requirements for such operations.
- 8.8. Equally important is the capacity to exploit both the tactical scene and the ED technical categorization. Accuracy of Post Blast Investigations (PBIs) and subsequent reporting are crucial in identifying lessons, understanding the existent threat and preparing for future threats. They also underpin TPKI, which is a critical foundation to providing detailed information to support the wider C-IED effort. PBI must be performed by personnel with the appropriate expertise and tasking within the Mission structure. To conduct PBI, collect forensics and report accurately and by that ultimately being able to degrade the network or system, it requires the involvement of Force generation, Mission planning and other stakeholders. Where a Mission lacks full forensics capability, i.e., collection, laboratory and analytical capabilities; measures should be institutionalised to obtain the required

⁷ 2017.18 United Nations IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police (Handbook) and 2021.11 UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Manual (both under review)

support. Such measures may include leveraging international cooperation and support and engaging the services of contractors with the required technical expertise and competencies. These efforts must be comprehensive and should involve a wide range of UN components, both uniformed and civilian, to effectively analyze and plan IED threat mitigation efforts in an integrated manner.

9. Degrading The Network

Politics and Diplomacy

- 9.1. In its resolution A/RES/70/46 (2015) on countering the threat posed by IEDs, "the United Nations General Assembly encourages States to enhance, as appropriate, international and regional cooperation, including the sharing of information on good practices, in cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organisation, in order to address the theft, diversion, loss and illicit use of materials for making IEDs, while ensuring the security of sensitive information shared."
- 9.2. DPO is to support this process by discussing and negotiating possibilities to and efforts to degrade adversarial networks with all relevant stakeholders, including host nations, international organizations, experts and others. These efforts must especially focus on engagement and partnership cooperation between UN Missions and host nations to achieve consensus within the judicial system to enhance legal prosecution of perpetrators.
- 9.3. The leadership of UN field Missions are to create integrated mechanisms which allow to achieve political consensus within host nation, with neighbouring countries and within regions for effective collaborations to address IED trafficking along with other issues such as transnational organised crime including illegal juvenile recruitment by armed groups.

Forces

- 9.4. DPO encourages joint operations through the integrated employment of capabilities and expertise of Missions' components, including military, police and civilians. Accordingly, host nation, coalition and other allied Forces present in the area of UN peace operations should be encouraged by Peacekeeping Missions to collaborate in degrading IED networks through mechanisms such as information sharing, proactive and reactive measures to mitigate IED threats, performing integrated operations to defeat IEDs and undertaking punitive and aggressive actions against perpetrators of IED attacks. According to the DPO PoC Policy 2019⁸, "military and police operations may extend to pre-empting and neutralising the source of the threat in accordance with the mandate, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Directive on the Use of Force (DUF)". Hence, DPO should ensure that the ROEs/DUFs specify proactive and responsive actions to be taken against the employment of IEDs by perpetrators. Furthermore, DPO should encourage regular in-mission trainings to ensure that the ROEs/DUFs are clearly understood by all contingents including troops, military, and police commanders in the field.

⁸ 2019.17 The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (Policy)

Legal system and Criminal Justice

9.5. DPO reaffirms the paramount significance of accountability for crimes against peacekeepers and the local population. The SC Resolution 2589 (2021)⁹ underlines the important role of United Nations' assistance to police, justice and correction institutions of host nations to strengthen the rule of law and the security sector reform with regards to bringing perpetrators to justice and addressing impunity as a key driver of instability. Hence, DPO must work on creating and employing forensic lab capacity at suitable levels, where appropriate, to further exploit evidence provided by IED Teams. This shall assist in developing credible evidence against the perpetrators of IED incidents and attacks for effective judicial process thereby degrading the network.

Protection of Civilians

9.6. PoC tasks are one of the most important efforts for UN Missions with a Security Council Mandated role to protect the most vulnerable groups of people. DPO must ensure that Missions factor mixed gender Engagement Teams/Platoons in planning interactions and engagements with local communities.¹⁰ These efforts have the potential to support situational awareness and build trust and respect, resulting in the local population being dissuaded from supporting adversarial IED networks and may assist in gaining IED related information to mitigate/prevent EO/IED incidents and reduce mis/disinformation against the UN. The IED perpetrators often employ the local population in executing IED attacks and these efforts would undermine adversarial IED networks.

D. IMPLEMENTATION

10. The execution of this Strategy will assist towards achieving a coherent response to IED threats in peacekeeping operations. Countering IED threats is a system wide approach that must integrate all stakeholders. Some roles and responsibilities are detailed within this Strategy at Annex B and a separate Implementation Plan would need to be developed. Accordingly, DPO should initiate necessary collaboration and coordination to develop an implementation matrix and a mechanism to regularly review progress to this Strategy and suggest amendments.

F. REFERENCES

Normative or Superior References

- A. A/RES/70/46 (2015).
- B. Lieutenant General (rtd) Carlos dos Santos Cruz report on Improving Security of UN Peacekeepers: We have to change the way we do business. December 2017.
- C. SC Resolution 2589 (2021).
- D. The United Nations Response to Explosive Ordnance Threats' (S/2021/1042) November 2021.
- E. A/77/19 United Nations Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2023 Substantive Session.

⁹ SC Resolution 2589

¹⁰ 2022.11 United Nations Engagement Platoon Handbook

Related Policies

- F. 2017.18 United Nations IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police (Handbook)
 - G. 2021.11 United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Manual.
 - H. 2020 United Nations Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialized Training Materials.
 - I. 2020 Military Engineer Unit and CET Search and Detect Manual (January 2020).
 - J. 2019.03 Weapons Ammunition Management Policy.
 - K. 2019.08 Department of Peace Operations Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy.
 - L. 2019.17 The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (Policy).
 - M. 2020 Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions - COE Manual (A/75/121).
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
APPROVAL SIGNATURE:



Jean-Pierre Lacroix
Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peace Operations

DATE OF APPROVAL: 18 March 2024

Integration of C-IED capability into the Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism



ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Office of Military Affairs

- 1.1. Develops and updates relevant doctrinal manuals to ensure current C-IED principles and IED disposal standards are included in applicable doctrine through periodic updates to incorporate lessons learned and emerging best practices.
- 1.2. Ensure force generation processes, including development and updating SURs and MOUs, incorporate C-IED capabilities of general and specialised units and teams. Emerging capability requirements such as forensic exploitation laboratories and counter UAS capacities are high priority efforts to be managed.
- 1.3. Ensure the conduct of Pre-Deployment/Rotation Visits, Military Skills Validation Exercises, and Advisory-and-Assessment Visits include robust and accountable assessments of critical C-IED skills and capacities.

2. Integrated Training Service

- 2.1. Support the implementation of mandatory Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT) for all uniformed personnel prior to deployment by providing appropriate training materials.
- 2.2. Manage the approval and accreditation of C-IED applicable specialised training materials to meet the doctrinal standards of both general Force and specialised units and teams
- 2.3. Seek solutions to Mission and P/TCC C-IED related training and capability gaps through multi-lateral partnerships or short-term support from UNMAS.

3. UNMAS

- 3.1. Provides C-IED subject matter expertise to both UNHQ and Missions to inform strategies, policies, doctrine, peacekeeping unit training programs in support of OMA, ITS, UNPOL and other UN organisations both at the HQ and within affected Missions.
- 3.2. Support to DOS and Mission DMS offices through Informing on equipment and technology procurement and management processes concerning specialised C-IED COE, ammunition/demolitions, and vehicles. \
- 3.3. Delivers gap-fill capability in response to emerging or increased IED threat to missions by providing pre-deployment and in-Mission training to P/TCCs on all aspects of C-IED capacities including threat awareness, search & detect, specialised EOD Disposal teams, and tactical planning considerations for combat leaders, mentorship of specialised units, and limited spot task response augmentation.
- 3.4. Provides additional C-IED trends and threat analysis and information management of IED related activity.

4. Department of Operational Support

- 4.1. Serves as the secretariat for the reimbursement framework for formed units deployed under a MOUs. Leads the MOU process and supports DPO in ensuring that capabilities are aligned with mandated tasks. Certifies reimbursements to Member States for capabilities deployed in UN field Missions.

5. Office of Director for Coordination and Shared Service

- 5.1. Manage the interoperability and integration of information systems to ensure an accurate and comprehensive situational awareness of the IED threat.

6. UN Police Division

- 6.1. Provide guidance and expertise to inform the Force generation processes of Formed Police Units and other police related capacities that account for C-IED capability requirements.
- 6.2. Assist in the strengthening of Missions forensic capacity and post-blast examinations of IED evidence for criminal proceedings.
- 6.3. Development and management of IED capable forensic exploitation capacity.
- 6.4. Facilitate Mission police components' support to national authorities for investigating and prosecuting crimes committed using IEDs.

7. Justice and Corrections Service

- 7.1. Provide strategic level guidance and expertise to Missions in engaging with national criminal justice systems regarding the use of IED and the accountability of crimes against peacekeepers and improving national authorities' judicial processes regarding explosive threats.

8. Missions

- 8.1. Establishes a standing counter-EO/IED working groups or committees to focus key Mission and encourage staff to implement and monitor critical C-IED efforts.
- 8.2. Maintain C-IED military expertise within Force staff to inform operational planning, peacekeeping-intelligence processes, and Force generation of key specialized Force enablers.

9. Police/Troop Contributing Countries

- 9.1. Responsible for training, preparing, and deploying general and specialised contingents capable of effectively conducting peacekeeping operations within an IED threat environment; meeting agreed standards of pledged capacity in accordance with SURs and MOUs.